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I. DETERMINISM AND MORAL MOTIVATION 
Most of us, certainly most of us working in universities, like to think that the spread of 
knowledge will be beneficial. Diffuse knowledge, goes this pleasingly democratic line, 
and people will be better off. But there is another strain of thought, going back at least to 
Plato, that takes the contrary course, arguing that widespread knowledge of the truth will 
be damaging, and so insisting on the need for the Noble Lie.  
 Some recent work in social psychology has lent support to this latter approach, 
apparently showing that getting subjects to reject the existence of free will or to believe 
in the truth of determinism makes them less likely to behave morally. In a pair of studies 
Vohs and Schooler found that getting subjects to read some passages arguing that free 
will is an illusion subsequently made them more likely to cheat in a test.2 In further 
studies, Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall found that reading passages propounding 
determinism increased subjects’ tendency to behave aggressively towards others (serving 
hot salsa to those who had said they hated it), and decreased their tendency to say that 
would behave helpfully in various situations.3 
 Assuming that these results are real, how are we to explain them?  One obvious 
explanation will occur to philosophers: if the subjects believe that free will is necessary 
for moral responsibility, then, given minimal rationality, undermining their belief in free 
will should be enough to undermine their belief that they are morally responsible.  And 
if they no longer think that they are morally responsible, immoral behaviour will follow. 
 Supporters of this interpretation might then point to a set of recent studies that seem 
to show that most people do think that moral responsibility is absent in a deterministic 
world, at least so long as they think sufficiently abstractly.4 If determinism is in fact true, 
the conclusion is a rather depressing one: we should either cultivate a belief in free will as 
a necessary illusion for moral behaviour; or else we need to embark on a probably 
fruitless attempt to convince the masses of the truth of compatibilism. 
 I want to suggest an alternative interpretation. Although it is true that some studies 
do suggest that most people believe that there is no moral responsibility in a 
deterministic world, it appears that this finding is highly sensitive to how the 
deterministic world in described.  A recent study by Eddy Nahmias and colleagues has 
                                                       
1 In addition to the Oslo Conference on Liking and Wanting, versions of this paper have been 
given at Florida State, Oxford, Edinburgh and Paris. I am very grateful to comments from the 
audiences there, and in particular to Kent Berridge, Elizabeth Fricker, Jennifer Hornsby, Joshua 
Knobe, Rae Langton, and Nick Shea. 
2 K. Vohs and J. Schooler, ‘The Value of Believing in Free Will’ ms. 
3 R Baumeister, E. Masicampo and C.N. DeWall, ‘Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free’ ms. 
4 See, for instance, S. Nichols and J. Knobe, ‘Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The 
Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’, Noûs 41 (2007), 663–685. For the caveat about the need for 
abstract thinking see Nahmias et al., ‘Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and 
Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Psychology 18 (2005) 561-584. 
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found that what subjects really find inimical to moral responsibility is mechanism: the 
idea that we are being pushed along by happenings at the molecular level. 5 And this 
finding is even more marked when they are asked, not about moral responsibility, but 
about freedom.  This opens the door to the possibility that the apparent commitment to 
incompatibilism stems from a misunderstanding of the true nature of determinism, one 
that sees it as more mechanistic than it need be. And on the basis of this we might try 
for an alternative explanation of the Vohs and Baumeister results: perhaps the 
deterministic texts are encouraging a mechanistic view of the way the world works, and 
the moral demotivation stems from the subject’s belief that that is incompatible with 
moral responsibility. 
 I think that this interpretation is a step in the right direction. But it still involves a 
highly theoretical bit of reasoning from the subjects: they have to think about the nature 
of morality and of the conditions that it requires. Mightn’t the explanation be rather 
more primitive than that? Sticking with the thought that stories of determinism 
encourage an overly mechanistic view of the world, mightn’t it be the case that this view 
is itself morally demotivating?  Perhaps reading the deterministic texts tends to make 
agents think of themselves as powerless. This can pick up on a very normal distinction 
that people ordinarily  make, between the things we can change, and the things we can’t. 
So let me start by looking to the nature of that distinction. 
 
 
WHAT YOU CAN CHANGE AND WHAT YOU CAN’T 
Luckily there is an obvious place to begin, with Martin Seligman’s admirably 
straightforward book What you can change and what you can’t.6 Seligman describes the 
book as a guide to self-help guides. His focus is on the things that people typically want 
to change about themselves and on the extent to which, by deciding to do so and 
employing the right approach, they can succeed in doing so. It turns out that some 
things are relatively easy to change. If you suffer from panic attacks, then with 
application and the right kind of cognitive therapy, you should be able to get over them. 
Around 95% of sufferers do. Other conditions are more rarely shaken: if you are an 
alcoholic then there is around a 33% chance that you will succeed in giving up. For other 
the success rate is even lower. If you are overweight and want to slim by dieting, there is 
very little chance—around 5%—that you will much reduce your weight in the long run. 
 A number of things are interesting about this. Obviously one is that the relative 
likelihood of change is not what one would expect: we know that dieting is hard, but it is 
shocking that success is that uncommon. A second, more philosophically interesting, 
point is that Seligman is working with a notion of what can and can’t be changed that is 
statistical or probabilistic. It is not that it is impossible to permanently lose weight by 
dieting, in the sense that no one ever does it. Five per cent do. It is rather that it is 
                                                       
5 E. Nahmias, D. J. Coates, and T. Kvaran, ‘Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: 
Experiments on Folk Intuitions’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007) 214-42. The study 
found that people think that neurological determinism (everything we do is determined by the 
prior arrangement of our neurons) poses more of a threat to free will and to moral responsibility 
than does psychological determinism (everything we do is determined by our prior beliefs, desires 
and intentions). The authors interpret this as driven by a different reactions to more or less 
mechanistic conceptions of determinism.  I think that that is very plausible, but the data could be 
interpreted rather differently. It could be seen as indicating an implicit belief in dualism. 
6 M. Seligman, What You Can Change and What You Can’t (New York: Knopf, 1993) 
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unusual to do so. Moreover, and here is a further philosophically interesting point, if we 
look in more detail at why that is, we find that it is because such change is difficult: it 
requires a tremendous amount of effort. Those who try to reduce their weight below a 
certain level typically become obsessed by food. They can think of little else. And in the 
end this incessant intrusion wears them down.7 
 Philosophers have historically been little concerned with such probabilistic measures. 
In looking at what an agent can or cannot do, the conception is typically absolute. Either 
one can lose weight or one can’t. And this is all the more marked when we look to 
discussions of freedom of the will. Typically this is thought to be a property of agents, 
rather than of particular actions. Beings either have free will or lack it: the classic 
question is whether human beings, or indeed any possible beings, fall into the first or the 
second class. Even when freedom is relativized to actions—when philosophers talk of an 
agent being free to do a certain thing—the conception is still typically absolute: the 
thought is that the agent either is or is not free to do it. In contrast Seligman explicitly 
takes a graded approach to freedom itself: an agent is more or less free to perform a 
certain action depending on how difficult that will be. At the limits perhaps there are 
things that no one will do however hard they try; and others where no one who puts 
their mind to it will fail. But the interesting cases fall in between.  
 I don’t specially want to castigate philosophers for working in absolute terms; I think 
that this is a very natural way of thinking. Indeed it is reflected even in the title of 
Seligman’s book: What you can change and what you can’t, not the more accurate (though 
admittedly rather less punchy) What is easy to change, and what isn’t. But more than this, I 
suspect that philosophers have a suspicion that there is no sense to be made of the idea of 
degree of effort, the idea that is needed in accounts like Seligman’s.8 I think that findings 
like those summarized by Seligman, and other findings that I will discuss later, show 
that we have to make sense of it: it is the best explanation of why some things are harder 
to change that others.  
 Of course, motivation plays a role too: one is much more likely to succeed in a task 
that takes a lot of effort if one is well-motivated to do so. But we have no reason to think 
that differences in motivation are the major explanation of the differences in success, so I 
won’t discuss that further. It also matters which techniques one uses to try to effect a 
change. Panic attacks are relatively easily cured using cognitive behavioral therapy, but 
do not respond well to psychoanalysis. Clearly this is something that we do need to 
factor in.  
 So let us give a rough characterization of a graded constraint on freedom as follows: 
 
Given the techniques they have at their disposal, an agent is less free to F the 
harder it is to follow though on a decision to F.9 
 
                                                       
7 For an accessible survey of some of the empirical data on how hard it is to loose weight by 
dieting see Gina Kolata, Rethinking Thin  (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). Of course 
this is a controversial issue, upon which I don’t want to rest too much. If you are sceptical, 
substitute one of the other things that are very hard to change, such as sexual orientation (for 
‘pure’ homosexuals, not bisexuals). 
8 See for example Gary Watson. In his excellent piece ‘Skepticism about Weakness of Will’ 
Philosophical Review 86 (1977), 316-339 Watson endorses an account based around the idea of 
degree of difficulty of resistance, but denies that there is any place for a notion of effort. 
9 Don’t put the definition in classic conditional form: ‘if one were to decide to F one would …’. 
We know from Frankfurt cases that that will fall foul of the conditional fallacy; moreover, it is 
quite unclear how to convert it to a graded form. 
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This isn’t a definition of freedom; for a start, there may be other ways in which freedom 
could be lost or diminished. It rather provides the basis of a necessary condition: one is 
not very free if following through is very difficult. Clearly even in specifying a necessary 
condition the account it offers is far from reductive. It leaves open quite what the 
relevant kind of difficulty is (it is the kind of thing that is more present in sticking to a 
diet than in the regulation of breathing needed to avoid panic attacks), and what it is to 
follow through (we are talking about success in achieving the actions immediately under 
the control of an agent, not their more distant consequences). But it should be clear 
enough to be going on with. 
 There are a lot of philosophers to whom this won’t be of much interest. For them 
the interesting question will be: are you free to make the decision to F in the first place? 
And the worry is that determinism shows that you are not. I don’t want to deny that this 
is an interesting question; it is an instance of a radical skepticism which philosophy has 
always been good at pursuing. But just as Cartesian skepticism isn’t the only interesting 
question in epistemology, so this radical skepticism isn’t the only interesting issue 
surrounding freedom. I want to suggest that thinking about freedom in the way that 
Seligman does helps us understand more about where our intuitions of freedom come 
from; and that whilst this in turn doesn’t answer all of the questions about moral 
responsibility—it doesn’t help with radical skepticism—it does help to explain the issues 
about our moral motivation with which we started. I’ll start with the source of our 
intuitions of freedom. 
 
 
 
INTUITIONS OF FREEDOM 
As I mentioned at the outset, with the right prompting, it is easy to elicit incompatibilist 
intuitions from people. But these intuitions aren’t standardly coupled with a belief in 
determinism. Rather they are coupled with a belief that we have free will.  Where does 
this belief come from?   
 Sometime it is said that we have a direct experience of freedom. But if freedom is 
really understood to be something that is incompatible with determinism, it is hard to 
know what such an experience would be like.  What is it to experience one’s action as not 
causally determined, or oneself as an uncaused cause?  I have no idea how that could be 
the content of an experience. The complaint here is an old one: Anthony Collins objects 
to those who appeal to vulgar experience to support libertarian views, ‘yet, inconsistently 
therewith, contradict the vulgar experience, by owning it to be an intricate matter, and 
treating it after an intricate matter’.10 
 What we need, I think, is to identify ways in which action is experienced as 
something that the agent instigates, rather than something that just happens to the agent 
as the result of the state that they were antecedently in.  And it will be all the better if we 
can have some explanation of how the experience of that state could be somehow 
mistaken for an experience of being an uncaused cause. 
 I will suggest two complementary possibilities. The first I have written about 
elsewhere, so I shall outline it quickly.  The second is my focus here. 
 
 
 
                                                       
10 An Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Second Edition 1717) p. 30. 
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FIRST EXPERIENCE OF FREEDOM: CHOICE 
In an earlier paper I argued that one important source of our belief in free will comes 
from our experience of choice.11 A quick and effective way to generate (or, more likely, to 
make salient) a conviction in undergraduates that they have free will is to get them to 
focus on what choice is like. Tell them to make an arbitrary choice, and then get them to 
act on it—to raise their left hand or their right, for instance—and they are, by and large, 
left with an unshakable conviction that their choice was a free one.  
 What is happening here? They have in the first instance an experience: an experience 
of doing something, namely making a choice. Quick on its heels comes a judgement, or a 
clutch of judgements: that they could have made either choice; or, more theoretically 
committed, that they could have made either choice compatibly with how they were 
prior to the choice; or more committed still, that they could have made either choice no 
matter how the whole world stood prior to the choice, and hence that they are, in that 
respect, unmoved movers.  
 As I have said, judgments like these last surely go well beyond the contents of the 
experience. How could one have experience of the rest of the world in a way that 
revealed that one’s action was itself uncaused? But the experience itself is an experience 
of something. At its heart, I suggest, are two aspects. First, we have an experience that 
provides the basis for a belief in the efficacy of choice, by which I mean that, in cases 
where the question of what to do arises, choice is both necessary and sufficient for 
action—choose to raise you right hand, and you’ll raise it, likewise with your left; fail to 
make either choice and you won’t raise either.12 Second, we have an experience of 
different choices being compatible with our prior beliefs, desires and intentions. 
Believing, desiring and intending as one does, one could either choose to raise one’s left 
hand or one’s right hand. In particular then, choice raises the possibility of akrasia, since 
one might judge that it was best to raise one’s left hand, and yet still raise one’s right.13  
 It is easy to see then how this experience could be mistaken for the experience of 
one’s actions being undetermined: one is mistaking a local claim of nondetermination 
(one’s action is not determined by one’s prior beliefs, desires, intentions etc.) for a global 
one (one’s action is not determined by anything). This could generate the incompatibilist 
beliefs. Alternatively, it could be that the incompatibilist beliefs come from an overly 
mechanistic understanding of what determinism is like. It might be understood to 
undermine the effectiveness of choice as I have characterized it. There is a common way 
of thinking about determinism according to which it leaves the agent completely passive. 
But before saying more about this, let me introduce what I take to be the second source 
of our intuitions about our freedom. For the mental activity needed to form an intention 
is not the only source of activity needed prior to action: there is also sometimes activity 
                                                       
11 ‘The Act of Choice’, Philosophers’ Imprint 6, (2006). 
12 The qualification ‘when choice arises’ is an important one. If much contemporary social 
psychology is right, most actions are performed automatically, with no need for choice. 
13 On this approach it is an interesting question as to why we have choice. It can look like a 
liability, opening as it does the possibilities of akrasia and inaction. Wouldn’t we do better as 
creatures whose actions are linked directly to what we judge best, circumventing any need for 
choice? Briefly, my answer was that, as cognitively limited creatures, we are frequently unable to 
make a judgment as to what is best. We need to be able to choose to act even in the absence of 
such judgements, especially if can be influenced by relevant factors, even if these are not 
perceptible at the level of judgement. For instance, it looks as though we can be sensitive to 
patterns in the world, so that our choices may be influenced by them, even though we form no 
conscious beliefs about them. 
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needed to turn the intention into action. And this is especially important for our 
concerns here, since whilst finding oneself unable to make a choice is pretty unusual (it 
happens perhaps in cases of Parkinson’s, and depression, and certain forms of prefrontal 
damage), finding intentions too hard to maintain is all too familiar. 
 
 
 
SECOND EXPERIENCE OF FREEDOM: MAINTAINING RESOLUTIONS 
Intentions play various roles in our mental economies.  As Michael Bratman has 
stressed, they can help us to curtail deliberation, and can enable us to achieve inter- and 
intra-personal coordination.14 In addition there is a special class of intentions that enable 
us to persist in an action even when we know that there will be strong inclinations to 
abandon it: inclinations stemming from temptation, fear, fatigue, or whatever. Call such 
intentions resolutions. Resolutions need to be particularly resistant to reconsideration, 
since it is in the nature of the states like temptation and fear that they tend not simply to 
provide strong contrary inclinations, but to corrupt our judgments as well. 
 Putting most intentions into action doesn’t require much on the agent’s part: if she 
has decided to stop off to buy milk after work, then typically all that is needed is that she 
keeps the intention in mind. Action will follow.  But in the case of resolutions things are 
very different. As we know from personal experience, implementing a resolution is 
difficult. This is just what is shown by the evidence that Seligman cites. For clearly the 
decisions involved in the cases he considers are resolutions: resolutions to eat less, drink 
less, control one’s fear and so on. And this is confirmed by a host of further empirical 
work. 
 Consider first the fact that the ability to abide by a resolution is affected by features 
that do not themselves seem to be desires or resolutions. Reformed alcoholics are far 
more likely to relapse if they are depressed, or anxious, or tired.15  Moreover states such 
as these affect one’s ability to abide by all of one’s resolutions: resolutions not to drink, 
not to smoke, to eat well, to exercise, to work hard, not to watch daytime television, or 
whatever. Now of course it is possible to explain this by saying that these states 
(depression, anxiety, fatigue etc.) systematically strengthen all of one’s desires to drink, 
smoke, eat, etc., or weaken all of one’s resolutions not to; but it is surely a more 
economical explanation to say that they affect one’s ability to act in line with one’s 
resolutions.16 For why else would there be such systematic effects?  
 Consider next the remarkable empirical literature on what is known as ‘ego 
depletion’. It appears that will-power comes in limited amounts that can be used up: 
controlling oneself to eat radishes rather than the available chocolate-chip cookies in one 
                                                       
14 Michael Bratman, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987) 
15 R. Baumeister, T. Heatherton and D. Tice, Losing Control (San Diego: Academic Press, 1994) pp 
151ff. The same is true of those who are dieting (ibid. pp. 184ff.), or trying to give up smoking 
(ibid. pp. 212ff.) or taking drugs (Muraven and Baumeister, ‘Self-Regulation and Depletion of 
Limited Resources’, p. 250). 
16 Moreover, whilst bad moods make dieters want to eat more, they tend to have the opposite 
effect on those who are not on a diet. So it seems that it is the resolution being affected, not the 
desire. See Muraven and Baumeister ‘Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources’ p. 251. 
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experiment makes one less likely to persist in trying to solve puzzles in the next17; 
suppressing one’s emotional responses to a film makes one less likely to persist, later on, 
in holding squeezed a handgrip exerciser.18  
 A final piece of evidence is that one can apparently develop one’s faculty of will-
power by repeated exercise. Again, the idea that one becomes virtuous by behaving 
virtuously is a commonplace one, stressed by Aristotle and by many who have followed 
him: ‘From holding back from pleasures we become moderate, and also when we become 
moderate we are most capable of holding back from them’.19 Some research suggests that 
this might be right: subjects who undergo a regime of self-regulatory exercises—working 
on improving their posture for instance—show markedly less tendency to suffer ego-
depletion.20  
 What exactly is the nature of the effort involved? We can get some handle on it by 
considering some of the most extreme cases, namely those involving addiction. People 
sometimes speak as though addiction hi-jacks the body: as though one’s intentional 
systems are simply by-passed. But whilst that may be true of some actions—certainly 
reflexes like startle, and perhaps, more interestingly, some actions performed in response 
to great fear21—addiction typically works through, rather than against, our intentional 
systems. There is good reason why this should be so. Meeting an addiction will typically 
require some real planning on the agent’s part: finding a dealer, negotiating a price, avoid 
arrest. It isn’t the kind of thing that could be achieved entirely by automatic actions. 
 It is the fact that addiction works through one’s intentional system that makes 
resistance possible. What is it then that makes it so hard? Work by Robinson and 
Berridge has indicated that addiction involves, very roughly, a decoupling of wanting and 
liking. Addicts need not like the substances to which they are addicted: they need take 
no pleasure in getting them, nor even in the prospect of getting them. Instead, addiction 
typically involves a sensitization of some parts of the mesolimbic dopamine system, with 
the result that perception, or just contemplation, of the addictive substance provides a 
strong motivation to get it.22 
                                                       
17 R. Baumeister, E. Bratslavsky, M. Muraven and D. Tice ‘Ego-depletion: Is the Active Self a 
Limited Resource?’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998) pp. 1252–65.  The 
puzzles were in fact insoluble. 
18Muraven, Tice and Baumeister, ‘Self-control as a Limited Resource’. 
19 NE 1104a34. Aristotle is here talking about how we develop the excellences. He does not 
explicitly say the same about the development of self-control though. He does say that lack of self-
control can be cured, but he doesn’t say how. 
20 M. Muraven, R. Baumeister and D. Tice, ‘Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation 
Through Practice: Building Self-Control Strength Through Repeated Exercise’ The Journal of 
Social Psychology 139 (1999) pp. 446–57.  
21 Geoffrey Keynes talks of his experiences as a doctor in the trenches in the First World War, 
finding his legs reluctant to take him towards the falling shells, despite his intention to go and 
tend to the wounded. Keynes, The Gates of Memory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) p. 137. Of 
course that involves lack of action, not action. It would have been odder if his legs had started 
walking of their own accord. Odder still if his body had embarked on a complex series of 
actions—walking to his horse, mounting it, riding back to his quarters, writing a letter to his 
commanding officer asking for compassionate leave or whatever. 
22 For a survey of a large body of work see T. Robinson and K. Berridge, ‘Addiction’ Annual 
Review of Psychology 54 (2003) 25–53. As against rational choice accounts which understand 
addiction in terms of a desire to avoid the pains of withdrawal, Robinson and Berridge’s account 
explains how the desire for the addictive substance can start before withdrawal sets in, and can 
continue long after it has passed. Indeed there is some evidence that the sensitization might be 
permanent.  
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 Now it might seem that the absence of liking would make it easier to resist: after all, 
it means that one just has to struggle against the urge to take the substance, and not also 
against the motivation that would be provided by liking it.23 But that is to misunderstand 
how human beings work. The point is that normally liking has its effect through the 
motivational system; increased liking leads one to want more. Conversely, if one likes 
something less, one is less motivated to pursue it. Once wanting and liking are decoupled 
that is no longer so: the motivational system goes on, despite changes that would 
normally act as a brake upon it. 
 It is plausible that much the same can be said about the decoupling effected between 
wanting and the more cognitive attitude of judging a thing good.  Standardly if I want 
something—a clever device for peeling garlic say—and then discover it doesn’t work, my 
want will simply evaporate.  But in cases of addiction there is an almost complete 
disconnection here. Coming to judge that the addictive substance is bad for me has very 
little effect on motivation to get it.24 Indeed, in so far as there is a tendency for 
motivation and judgments about what is good to line up in cases like addiction, it is 
plausible that the influence goes in the other direction.  Knowing the way in which they 
will act, subjects rewrite their judgments about what is good to avoid cognitive 
dissonance.25 Nonetheless, these judgments will have further causal impact—ego 
depletion shifts agents’ choices about what to consume later as well as choices about 
what to consume now.26 
 The kind of wanting involved in addiction does not appear fundamentally different 
to the kind of wanting involved in other more ordinary circumstances. It is strong, but it 
works in much the same sort of way: by capturing the attention, focusing though on 
what is desired, narrowing horizons. In cases of addiction this is extreme enough to 
count as craving; but this too can be a feature of non-addicted desire.27 What is most 
saliently different is that, since it is decoupled from liking and from beliefs about what is 
best, it cannot be changed by changes in them. Impervious to undermining, it can only 
be directly resisted. 
                                                       
23 For something like the picture that the different forces are additive, see David Velleman’s ‘What 
Happens When Someone Acts’, Mind, 101, (1992), pp. 461-481. 
24It might be argued that states disconnected in these ways should not count as desires; Scanlon, 
for instance, writes that ‘what is generally called having a desire involves having a tendency to see 
something as a reason’ (Scanlon, 1998) pp. 39.  That strikes me as either wrong (if viewed as a 
description of our current practice of using the term), or as an unhelpful stipulation (if viewed as 
a instruction for how we should use it). Addictive desires are surely desires. What is plausible in 
these writers’ accounts is the thought that desire might be a cluster concept, and that there might 
be dissociable elements within the cluster. For a nice discussion of how this can lead to difficulties 
in deciding which desire is strongest, see Lloyd Humberstone, ‘Wanting, Getting, Having’ 
Philosophical Papers 19 (1990), 99–118. 
25 The findings here concern inability to delay gratification rather than addiction. See R. Karniol 
and D. Miller ‘Why not wait? A cognitive model of self-imposed delay termination’ Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 45 (1983) pp. 935–42. It is well established that, after making a 
choice, subjects tend to view the option that they have chosen as more markedly superior to the 
alternatives than they did before: a phenomenon that is known as ‘post-decisional spreading of 
alternatives. See J. Brehm and H. Cohen Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Wiley, 
1962).  
26 Baumeister et al, ‘Free will in consumer behavior: Self-control, ego depletion and choice’ 
Journal of Consumer Psychology 18 (2008) 4–13, at p. 9. 
27 For good discussion of the features of craving see George Loewenstein, ‘A Visceral Account of 
Addiction’ in J. Elster and O-J Skog (eds.) Getting Hooked, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 235–64 
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 How then does resistance work? Our best account comes from studies of delayed 
gratification. Mischel found that children can resist temptation better if they can avoid 
reconsideration of their intention to hold out; once they start to reconsider they are likely 
to succumb.28 Similarly, Gollwitzer has found that forming implementation intentions—
that is, intentions that are detailed enough that one hardly needs to think in order to 
implement them—avoids ego depletion.29 
 So this gives us some take on the kind of effort required to resist temptation, and on 
why it is so hard. One is confronted with insistent desires that capture the attention. 
Since one cannot undermine them, one can only resist them by endeavouring not to 
reconsider one’s resolutions: a form of mental control.  
 Let me say a little about what this control may be like. It might seem that the best 
strategy is not to think about one’s resolutions at all: form them and then act on them, 
without so much as contemplating them or the possibility of acting otherwise. Perhaps 
this is the idea that we have the very strong-willed individual who, as we might say, is 
never really tempted by the alternatives. However, in many cases it would not work at 
the very point at which it is needed. 30 
 This kind of unthinking pattern best describes those actions that are automatic. 
Force yourself to get up at six every morning to go for a run, and after a while it will 
probably become automatic. The alarm clock will go, you will get out of bed, put on your 
running kit, and get outside without really giving thought to what you are doing. But the 
point at which an action becomes automatic is really the point at which will-power is no 
longer needed. There is good reason for this. At least to begin with, a resolution is 
typically a resolution to reform one’s behaviour into paths which are not automatic. 
Indeed standardly the automatic behaviour is frequently exactly the behaviour that one 
has resolved to stop—lighting up a cigarette for instance. If one is to be successful in 
resisting having a cigarette, and if cigarettes are around, one must constantly monitor 
whether or not one has picked one up; and one can hardly do that without thinking 
about cigarettes, and the possibility of smoking them. Successful resolutions cannot work 
unthinkingly.31 
 So to maintain a resolution like giving up smoking we need something in between 
full-blown reconsideration and unthinking action. Most resolutions are, I suspect, like 
                                                       
28 For a summary of a large body of work see Mischel ‘From Good Intentions to Willpower’ in P 
Gollwitzer and J Bargh (eds.) The Psychology of Action (New York: The Guildford Press 1996) pp. 
197–218. 
29 P. Gollwitzer, K. Fujita, & G. Oettingen, ‘Planning and the implementation of goals’, in   R. 
Baumeister & K. Vohs (eds.) Handbook of Self-Regulation (New York: Guilford Press, 2004) pp. 
211-228; P. Gollwitzer, U. Bayer, & K. McCullouch, ‘The Control of the Unwanted’, in R. Hassin, 
J. Uleman, & J. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 
485-515. This might help explain why people are more likely to be successful giving up alcohol 
than losing weight. One can form a simple implementation intention never to drink alcohol again, 
one that will need no further consideration. In contrast one cannot simply decide not to eat again: 
one will need to be constantly considering what is a permissible amount.  For this explanation see 
G. Ainslie, Breakdown of Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) p. 147. 
30 Here and in the seven paragraphs that follow I draw on my ‘How is Strength of Will Possible?’ 
in S. Stroud and C Tappolet (eds.) Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2003) pp. 39-67, which gives a more detailed account; see also my ‘Rational 
Resolve’, Philosophical Review 113 (2004) pp. 507-35. 
31 The need for self-monitoring is central to Carver and Scheier’s influential feedback account. See 
C. Carver and M. Scheier, On the Self-Regulation of Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1998). 
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this. What we need is a state that involves awareness of the resolution, and perhaps of 
the considerations for which it is held, but which doesn’t involve reconsideration. The 
crucial factor here is that the resolution is not suspended. To remind oneself of one’s 
resolutions is not, by itself, to bring them into question. It is important that it is not 
suspended. For, as we have seen, once a resolution is suspended, it will all too easily be 
revised. We thus need a state of awareness that falls short of suspension: what I shall call 
rehearsal. 
 I speak as though the contrast between reconsideration and rehearsal is a sharp one. 
In fact, of course, there will be many states in between: what I have marked out are the 
extremes of a continuum. Moreover, very often mere rehearsal will lead one into 
reconsideration. This is unsurprising when one’s rehearsal leads one to dwell on the 
benefits to be gained by yielding to temptation; but empirical work shows that the same 
effect will often come even when one’s focus is on the benefits to be gained by holding 
out.  
 Can we resist the slide from rehearsal to reconsideration by dint of mental effort? It 
might seem that this would require an ability to repress thought. The difficulty with such 
advice is that it is very hard to control one’s thoughts directly. Indeed, the effort is 
typically counterproductive: attempting to repress a thought leads one to dwell on it all 
the more.32 But need it be that mental control involves such direct repression? 
 In seeing the possibilities it is useful to look to the advice given by those 
professionally concerned with the business of resisting temptation. Here is a 
representative passage from Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits: 
 
There are two ways of gaining merit when an evil thought comes from outside: 
the first ... I resist it promptly and it is overcome; the second I resist it, it recurs 
again and again and I keep on resisting until the thought goes away defeated ... 
One sins venially when the same thought of committing a mortal sin comes and 
one gives ear to it, dwelling on it a little or taking some sensual enjoyment from 
it, or when there is some negligence in rejecting this thought.33 
 
Quite what does ‘resisting’ a thought amount to? It does not seem that Ignatius is calling 
for out-right thought suppression. Rather he talks of the risks of dwelling on a thought, 
or of taking some sensual enjoyment from it. The idea seems to be, not that we can keep 
certain thoughts out entirely, but that we can avoid focusing on them and developing 
them. Here it does seem far more plausible that we have some control.  
  I know of no studies on this, but some light might be shed by considering some 
parallel cases, even if the parallel is far from perfect. Suppose I ask you not to think of 
the number two. That is almost impossible, and the very effort of monitoring what you 
are doing makes your failure all the more certain. But suppose I ask you not to multiply 
    by   . Unless you are extraordinarily good at mental arithmetic, so that the answer 
simply jumps out at you, you won’t find my request hard to comply with at all. Nor will 
your monitoring of what you are doing undermine your compliance. Similarly, suppose I 
ask you not to think through, in detail, the route that you take from home to work. You 
                                                       
32 D. Wegner, White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts (New York: Viking Press, 1989); J. 
Uleman and J. Bargh (eds.) Unintended Thought (New York: the Guildford Press 1989). Again, it 
has been suggested that this is connected with the idea of self-monitoring: in order to be sure that 
one is not thinking about something one needs to monitor that one is not: D. Wegner ‘Ironic 
Processes of Mental Control’ Psychological Review 101 (1994) 34–52. 
33 Spiritual Exercises, ¶¶ 33–5, in Personal Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin,     ) p.    . 
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might not be able to resist imagining the starting point; but I suspect, unless you live 
very close to work, that you will be able to stop yourself somewhere down the track. The 
point seems to be that there are quite a few steps needed to perform a long multiplication 
or to imaginatively trace one’s route, steps that have to be taken in a particular order, and 
one is able to exercise some control over such a process.  
 I suggest that things are typically similar with the thoughts involved in the revision 
of resolutions. It might be impossible to control whether we entertain the thought of 
having a cigarette. But it might be possible to control whether or not we go through the 
procedure that is involved in revising one’s resolution not to. This also seems to be the 
kind of thing that Ignatius has in mind. The sin does not consist in having the evil 
thought that ‘comes from outside’; Ignatius accepted that that is inevitable. The sin 
comes with what I do with it. And it is here that resistance is hard. 
 
  
 
MUDDLING FATALISM AND DETERMINISM 
How does this help explain the experience of freedom?  As with making a choice, the 
idea is that one is actively doing something when one is sticking with a resolution. Once 
again one’s prior psychological states—desires, beliefs, intentions, etc.—do not suffice for 
determining what one will do since they do not determine how much effort one will put 
in. How does this explain a tendency to embrace incompatibilism? Again one possibility 
is that people misrepresent this local non-determinism as global. Alternatively, and this 
is the interpretation I favour, it could be that they tend to misunderstand what 
determinism would be like, as something that is incompatible with effecting change by 
employing effort.  Let us consider this possibility in more detail. 
 Fatalism is a common theme in fiction. An excellent, and much quoted, example 
comes in the speech that Somerset Maugham gives to Death: 
 
 
There was a merchant in Baghdad who sent his servant to market to buy 
provisions and in a little while the servant came back, white and trembling, and 
said, Master, just now when I was in the market-place, I was jostled by a woman 
in the crowd and when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at 
me and made a threatening gesture; now, lend me your horse, and I will ride away 
from this city and avoid my fate. I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find 
me. The merchant lent him the horse and the servant mounted it, and he dug his 
spurs in its flanks and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. Then the merchant 
went down to the market-place and he saw me standing in the crowd and he came 
to me and said, Why did you make a threatening gesture to my servant when you 
saw him this morning? That was not a threatening gesture, I said, it was only a 
start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment 
with him tonight in Samarra.34 
 
                                                       
34 S. Maugham Sheppey: A Play in Three Acts (London: W. Heinemann, 1933), Act III. It is 
quoted  by many authors from John O’Hara on. The origin of the story appears to be from the 9th 
Century author Fudail ibn Ayad; see Idreis Shah, Tales of the Dervishes (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1967) p. 191. I am indebted here to J.H. Sobel ‘Notes on “Death Speaks”’ at 
http://www.scar.utoronto.ca/~sobel/PuzzlesDEATHSPEAKS.pdf 
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The servant’s effort and enterprise will make a difference to the immediate outcome: he 
will get on the horse and ride to Samarra. But whatever he does he won’t be able to 
escape the ultimate end to which fate has assigned him. The theme is a familiar one in 
classical mythology, and more recently in those time travel stories in which an agent is 
involved in a project in which we know they must fail—trying to kill their own younger 
self for example.  In terms of Seligman’s continuum, one’s fate belongs at the extreme 
end of what one can’t change, even beyond the fruitless attempt to lose weight. 
 I suspect that a common idea is that if determinism were true, everything would be 
like that: effort would make no difference to outcome. On this view determinism would 
be a form of global fatalism, in the sense that one would be unable to change one’s 
actions. Of course, there is a difference between the classic fatalist cases and 
determinism. As I mentioned, classic fatalism involves frustration at a distance. One 
performs one’s basic action, only to find that it doesn’t help: the servant gets to Samarra, 
only to find that that death is there waiting for him.  If determinism is a universal form 
of fatalism, it will also bring a more immediate frustration: if one has been determined to 
do otherwise, then one will not even perform the basic action that one is aiming to 
perform, no matter how much effort one puts in. But this just makes the fatalism all the 
more pressing, since it begins at home. No exercise of effort will change anything. Every 
action is crowded at one end of Seligman’s spectrum. 
 I hope it is clear how this involves a mechanistic picture. It is certainly one in which 
it is reasonable to think of us as pawns in the hands of impersonal forces. I hope that it is 
equally clear that as an intepretation of determinism it is simply a mistake. It is 
reminiscent of the Lazy argument used against the Stoics: if one is fated either to recover 
or to die, what use is there in calling the doctor? Chryssipus’s response, whether or not it 
answers all the worries, is apposite to our concerns here: to say that it is determined that 
Oedipus will be born to Laius is not to say that this will be so ‘whether or not Laius has 
intercourse with a woman’.35 Having intercourse is a necessary condition for having a 
son. If it is determined that Oedipus will be born to Laius, then it is determined that 
Laius will have intercourse; the two are ‘co-fated’, to use Chryssipus’s term. But that 
doesn’t undermine the causal efficacy of the act.36 
 Similarly if we got conclusive proof of the truth of determinism, we wouldn’t throw 
Seligman’s book away. Seligman is talking about how much effort is needed to effect 
different kinds of change.  In a deterministic model it is still true that different changes 
require people to put in different amounts of effort, and, crucially, that the effort they 
put in makes a difference. If there hadn’t been the effort, the outcome would have been 
different. So it is still true that it that sense people act: their efforts are not thwarted by 
forces that ensure an inevitable outcome.  
 But despite being a mistake, my suggestion is that this is the view that reading much 
deterministic literature tends to induce in people. They understand the impact of 
determinism in terms of a distinction—Seligman’s distinction between what you can 
change and what you can’t—that they already have. And it leads them to think that every 
                                                       
35 As quoted by Cicero, On Fate 30, translation in A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p.339. 
36 For discussion of Chryssipus’s argument see Susanne Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in 
Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) Ch. 5. As she points out (pp. 231–3), 
Chryssipus is not really concerned to answer the question of how something that is determined 
can still be up to us: what I earlier called the more global skepticism.  
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attempt to influence things by putting in effort falls on one side of that distinction. To 
use the psychological terminology, it undermines their self-efficacy.37  
 
 
 
DETERMINISM AND MORAL MOTIVATION AGAIN 
My contention then is that reading determinism passages will tend to increase subjects’ 
scepticism about whether their efforts will have any impact. In particular, it will lead 
them to think that struggling against their inclinations will be futile. This is not to say 
that they will cease acting, but that they will think of their actions as themselves 
determined by their beliefs and desires. 
 Inducing belief about the futility of struggle is a classic seduction strategy. Witness 
how Rodolphe overcomes any remaining resistance from Emma Bovary by describing 
how fate works to draw lovers together: 
 
Come what may, sooner or later, in six months, ten years, they will be together, 
will be lovers, because Fate ordains it, because they were born for each other. 
 
And now applying the lesson to them: 
 
Look at us … why did we meet? By what decree of Fate? It must be because, 
across the void, like two rivers irresistibly converging, our unique inclinations 
have been pushing us towards one another.38  
 
Now we have clearly reached the moral sphere. Where people would normally think that 
they could resist the inclination to cheat, or the inclination to prank with hot salsa, a 
belief in fate will make them more sceptical. And this will lead them not to try, or to give 
up more readily if they do.  
 Here then is how I suggest we interpret the experiments that show that a belief in 
determinism is morally demotivating. The effect of such a belief will be relatively direct.  
Subjects do not need to think about the nature of morality, and of whether the existence 
moral responsibility requires the falsity of determinism. Indeed the considerations that 
move them are not directly about morality at all. Rather they are just about whether 
putting in effort will make any difference. Morality is just one instance of the more 
general phenomenon of resisting contrary inclinations. And that provides a way of 
evaluating whether my conjectures are true.  For if they are, the effect should be just as 
marked on cases that do not involve morality at all. Dieters who read deterministic 
passages should be more ready to break their diets.   
 If this is right, then there is something very interesting about subjects’ responses 
once they take fatalism on board. It is not as though they stop acting altogether: they 
cheat; they give salsa to those who loathe it. Rather, they stop exercising self-control. 
                                                       
37 In general self-efficacy—one’s belief in one’s own degree of control—is extremely import in 
explaining behaviour. For a general overview see A. Bandura, ‘Exercise of Personal Agency 
Through the Self-Efficacy Mechanism’ in R Schwarzer (ed.) Self-Efficacy (Bristol PA: Taylor and 
Francis, 1992) pp. 3–38. 
38 G. Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. G. Wall (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) Part 2, Chap. 
8. Rodolphe’s approach is subtler still, since he suggests that it is merely the pressure of 
conventional morality that will be overcome by fate; he doesn’t acknowledge to Emma that she is 
struggling against her conscience.  
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People see themselves as working on two levels. They are moved by certain prior beliefs, 
desires and intentions; but they have an ability to control whether they will actually act 
on those states.39 If a belief in the non-existence of free will, and the truth of 
determinism, impacts primarily on self-control, then this suggests that it is self-control 
that provides a primary source of the experience of freedom. 
 More reassuring for philosophers is that these concerns at least leave us with no need 
to propogate a Noble Lie of indeterminism. What is needed is a more careful—a more 
truthful—account of what determinism involves.  
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39 This two level view is a pervasive feature of our psychological and moral thought. It comes up, 
for instance, in the legal doctrine of provocation. For discussion see Richard Holton and Stephen 
Shute, ‘Self–Control in the Modern Provocation Defence’, The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27 
pp. 49–73. 
 
